Yuzhe Liu, Fudan University; Zhijie Liu, ShanghaiTech University; Zhengmin Yu, Fudan University; Shu Wang, Northwest University and Xi'an Key Laboratory of Advanced Computing and Software Security; Ling Jiang, Sen Nie, and Shi Wu, Tencent Security Keen Lab; Zhanyong Tang, Northwest University and Xi'an Key Laboratory of Advanced Computing and Software Security; Yuan Zhang, Fudan University
Yizhi Huang, Georgia Institute of Technology; David Oygenblik, Georgia Tech; Runze Zhang, Mingxuan Yao, Muhammad Ibrahim, Burak Sahin, Haichuan Xu, Saman Zonouz, and Brendan Saltaformaggio, Georgia Institute of Technology
Yanzhong Wang, Wenhui Zhang, Ruigang Liang, Kai Chen, Yi Yang, and Zhiyu Zhang, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Junyan Jiang, School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Michael Chesser, Adelaide University; Paul Quirk, Defence Science and Technology Group; Douglas Cooke and Guy Farrelly, Adelaide University; Surya Nepal, CSIRO; Damith C. Ranasinghe, Adelaide University
Zhenkai Hu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and State Key Laboratory of Cryptology; Haofei Liang, Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Xiao Wang, Northwestern University; Xiang Xie, East China Normal University and Primus Labs; Kang Yang, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology; Yu Yu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute; Wenhao Zhang, Northwestern University
Zhihao Li, Ant Digital Technologies, Ant Group; Hongyu Wang, Shanxi University; Yuan Zhao and Lichun Li, Ant Digital Technologies, Ant Group; Zhiwei Wang, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS; Jiaxing He, Changzheng Wei, and Ying Yan, Ant Digital Technologies, Ant Group; Lifeng Guo, Shanxi University
Zikai Zhou, Tsinghua University; William Seo and Edward Chen, Carnegie Mellon University; Alex Ozdemir, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Fraser Brown and Wenting Zheng, Carnegie Mellon University
Yueming Li, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Long Chen, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and Key Laboratory of System Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Qianwen Gao, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Zhenfeng Zhang, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and Key Laboratory of System Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Quanbi Feng, Southern University of Science and Technology; Pinshen Xu, Jianyu Niu, and Cong Wang, City University of Hong Kong; Yinqian Zhang, Southern University of Science and Technology
核心总结
论文研究 Solana 中 Proof of History (PoH) 时间语义的安全影响,发现恶意领导者可通过扣留并延迟释放提交更早 PoH 逻辑时间的合法区块,触发诚实验证者的 PoH 重锚定。基于此原语提出时间膨胀攻击 (TI) 和分叉辅助时间膨胀攻击 (FTI),前者延长恶意领导者出块时间预算,后者进一步利用分叉选择抑制诚实领导者提案。作者给出形式化分析,刻画重锚定发生条件并在现实网络和权益假设下界定攻击影响。在测试床实现攻击并报告给 Solana 团队,同时分析链上数据发现与 TI 激励通道相符的时序和包含模式,最后讨论防御措施。
Robin Linus Woll, Stanford University and ZeroSync Association; Lukas Aumayr, University of Edinburgh and Common Prefix; Zeta Avarikioti, TU Wien and Common Prefix; Matteo Maffei, TU Wien; Andrea Pelosi, University of Pisa, University of Camerino, and TU Wien; Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos, Imperial College London and Common Prefix; Christos Stefo, TU Wien; David Tse, Stanford University and Byzantine Research; Alexei Zamyatin, BOB
Hao Gao and Qianhong Wu, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University; Hangzhou Innovation Institute of Beihang University; Bo Qin, Renmin University of China; Fudong Wu, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University; Hangzhou Innovation Institute of Beihang University; Zhenyang Ding, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University
Liqun Chen, Long Meng, Yalan Wang, Nada El Kassem, Christopher JP Newton, Yangguang Tian, Jodie Knapp, Constantin Cătălin Drăgan, and Daniel Gardham, University of Surrey; Mark Manulis, Universität der Bundeswehr München
Yizhong Liu, Beihang University and Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Future Blockchain and Privacy Computing; Boyu Zhao, Yuxuan Hu, Haojun Tan, Feiang Ran, Andi Liu, and Zhuocheng Pan, Beihang University; Yuan Lu, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Song Bian, Jianwei Liu, and Zhenyu Guan, Beihang University
Yunlv Lv and Rui Zhang, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Zhiyuan Zhang, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Ziyi Wan, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Lanxue Zhang, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Minhui Xue, CSIRO's Data61 and Responsible AI Research (RAIR) Centre, Adelaide University; Jiangtao Li, East China Normal University; Yanan Cao, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Ranyang Liu, the College of Cryptology and Cyber Science, DISSec, Nankai University; Xiaojie Guo, Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute; Tong Li and Zheli Liu, the College of Cryptology and Cyber Science, DISSec, Nankai University
Meng Hao, Singapore Management University; Guodong Wang, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Xinpeng Yang, Nanyang Technological University; Pengzhi Xing and Hanxiao Chen, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Tianwei Zhang, Nanyang Technological University; Haiyang Xue and Guomin Yang, Singapore Management University; Hongwei Li, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Robert H. Deng, Singapore Management University
Hao Guo and Zhaoqian Liu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Liqiang Peng, Alibaba Group; Shuaishuai Li, Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China; Ximing Fu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Weiran Liu and Lin Qu, Alibaba Group
Ian Chang and Sela Navot, University of Washington; Alex Ozdemir, Max Planck Institute for Security & Privacy, Georgia Tech; Nirvan Tyagi, University of Washington
Sanjam Garg, University of California, Berkeley; Alireza Kavousi, University College London; Dimitris Kolonelos and Erkan Tairi, University of California, Berkeley; Zhipeng Wang, The University of Manchester
Shengzhe Meng and Xiaodong Wang, Tsinghua University; Xv Zhou, Beihang University; Bei Liang, Beijing Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Applications
Rosario Giustolisi, IT University of Copenhagen; Gabriele Lenzini, University of Luxembourg; Chuanwei Lin, University of Luxembourg and Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Mohammadamin Rakeei, University of Luxembourg; Andy Rupp, University of Luxembourg and KASTEL Security Research Labs
核心总结
端到端加密是现代安全消息的基础,Signal 协议是事实标准,但执法机构要求解密用户流量,因此关键问题是:当对手能够常规解密 Signal 消息时,用户是否仍能安全隐蔽地通信。本文从变形加密(anamorphic encryption)角度出发,设计两种构造,将隐蔽信道嵌入现有 Signal Double Ratchet 协议:一种嵌入非对称棘轮使用的 Diffie-Hellman 密钥,另一种嵌入对称棘轮产生的认证标签。这些技术兼容现有 Signal 部署,无需服务提供商修改;作者在捕获合法访问解密能力对手的威胁模型中形式化安全,并证明生成的协议转录与标准 Signal 不可区分。作者在官方 Signal 库和 Android 客户端实现构造,显示低开销且实际可行,表明即使常规 E2EE 保证被破坏,隐蔽通信信道仍可存在。
Tianrui Wang, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, BNRist, Tsinghua University; Anyu Wang, Institute for Advanced Study and State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Tsinghua University; Zhongguancun Laboratory; Tianshuo Cong, School of Cryptologic Science and Engineering and Shandong Key Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence Security, Shandong University; Delong Ran, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, BNRist, Tsinghua University; Jinyuan Liu, Institute for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University; Xiaoyun Wang, Institute for Advanced Study and State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Tsinghua University; Zhongguancun Laboratory; National Financial Cryptography Research Center; Shandong Institute of Blockchain
Zhou Zhang, Ran Mao, Zian Zhao, Haowen Pan, Yunhao Fu, Yizhong Liu, and Dawei Li, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University; Yi Chen, Bo Zhang, Changrui Ren, and Jin Dong, Beijing Academy of Blockchain and Edge Computing; Zhenyu Guan and Song Bian, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University
核心总结
该论文研究单服务器、无离线提示的批量私有信息检索(PIR)效率问题。现有无提示 PIR 可通过跨方案密文转换实现,但在批量查询场景下会带来显著计算和通信开销。作者提出 SPIRIT,利用有状态密文转换同时实现高吞吐查询与低通信成本:设计有状态密钥扩展过程将转换开销摊销到多次查询,并基于共享中间表示提出新的响应压缩策略,把一批 PIR 响应高效打包进单个密文。实验表明,SPIRIT 相比最先进的批量 PIR 协议可将查询执行速度提升 3.1–5.1 倍,并将通信带宽降低 2.3–3.6 倍。
Mingyu Bian, Jiabei Wang, Dandan Xu, Guangyu Huang, and Yongbin Zhou, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Hongxiao Wang, The University of Hong Kong; Ron Steinfeld, Monash University; Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen, Information Security Laboratory, Tampere University; Muhammed F. Esgin, Monash University; Siu-Ming Yiu, The University of Hong Kong
Feng Li and Xiangfu Song, Nanyang Technological University; Yingying Li, Hangzhou Normal University; Lisha Yao and Guomin Yang, Singapore Management University; Tianwei Zhang, Nanyang Technological University; Robert H. Deng, Singapore Management University
核心总结
该论文研究面向隐私保护云数据库和外包存储的分布式不经意 RAM(DORAM)。现有两服务器 DORAM 设计常依赖慢速线性扫描或重量级密码学原语,难以兼顾效率与带宽。作者提出 DuetORAM,核心是“复制到共享”的块编码:服务器可保存相同密文以支持高效 PIR 检索,同时本地将其解释为秘密共享,从而通过轻量洗牌实现不经意驱逐。论文还设计了带离线-在线分解的秘密共享洗牌,将大部分带宽密集工作转移到预处理阶段。实验表明,DuetORAM 在局域网中相比最先进两服务器方案 DUORAM 可将检索延迟降低最多 170 倍,相比三服务器方案 S^3ORAM 检索延迟降低 1.7 倍,驱逐在 LAN 和 WAN 分别加速 7 倍和 5 倍。
Shijie Jia, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Bowen Xu, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Ningbo University; Yuan Ma, Yingjiao Niu, Limin Liu, and Daren Zha, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Jingqiang Lin, School of Cyber Security, University of Science and Technology of China
Cristiano Rodrigues, Centro ALGORITMI, Universidade do Minho; Marton Bognar, DistriNet, KU Leuven; Sandro Pinto, Centro ALGORITMI, Universidade do Minho; Jo Van Bulck, DistriNet, KU Leuven
Zhongjing Wei, Osaid Muhammad Ameer, Yupeng Zhang, and Nikita Borisov, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
核心总结
现代化控制关键基础设施的运营技术系统面临安全挑战;由于边缘设备能力有限,现有方案依赖与身份管理系统交互并执行访问策略的应用网关,但网关部署管理负担大,需要与远程分布式边缘设备共置、持续打补丁并最小化停机。本文提出Prezta,一种通过客户端零知识虚拟机(zkVM)内评估策略来消除网关的架构,zkVM生成简洁的授权证明,边缘设备可高效验证,从而将零信任安全边界扩展到边缘,且策略和身份管理方案演进无需更新边缘设备。作者基于RISC Zero zkVM实现原型,支持XACML 3.0策略和JWT身份声明;通过将策略编译为Rust代码、预编译正则表达式并优化签名验证和JWT解析,将证明者时间降低超过一个数量级。评估显示其编译器正确实现83%的XACML 3.0一致性测试套件,桌面端证明生成耗时数十秒,而验证仅需数十毫秒,适合资源受限边缘设备。
Sriram Sridhar, University of California, Berkeley; Shravan Srinivasan, Lagrange Labs; Dimitrios Papadopoulos, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Charalampos Papamanthou, Lagrange Labs and Yale University
Tao Lu, Jipeng Zhang, and Yanpei Guo, National University of Singapore; Xuanming Liu, Zhejiang University; Wenjie Qu, National University of Singapore; Zonghui Wang and Wenzhi Chen, Zhejiang University; Jiaheng Zhang, National University of Singapore
Weihan Li, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University; Ant Group; Zongyang Zhang, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University; Sherman S. M. Chow, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Yanpei Guo, National University of Singapore; Boyuan Gao, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University; Xuyang Song, Anoma; Yi Deng, School of Cryptology, Xidian University; Jianwei Liu, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University
Jian Qu, Yuchen Zhang, Jialong Zhang, and Jianfeng Li, MOE Key Laboratory for Intelligent Networks and Network Security, Xi’an Jiaotong University; Xiaobo Ma, MOE Key Laboratory for Intelligent Networks and Network Security and Shaanxi Province Key Laboratory of Computer Network, Xi’an Jiaotong University
Shaojing Zhang, College of Computer Science and Technology, Qingdao University; Chengliang Tian, College of Computer Science and Technology, Qingdao University, and State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Shandong University; Ruixue Wang and Hequn Xian, College of Computer Science and Technology, Qingdao University; Guangwu Xu, State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security and School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University
核心总结
该论文研究分布式 RSA 模数生成中保持因子私密的核心问题,改进了现有分布式 Miller-Rabin 素性测试中的可除性测试。作者提出一种新颖的零测试协议,其核心是分布式 Montgomery 约减设计,将判断 δ mod f = 0 转化为判断乘积是否为零,从而实现确定性、完美正确的零测试。新协议仅需 7 轮和 5 次安全乘法,优于此前需要 3+⌈log2 n⌉ 轮与 n+3 次乘法或 8 轮与 5n-1 次乘法的方案。实验表明在诚实多数设置下,当 n ≥ 9 时加速比随参与方数量增加而增大,且可支持诚实/不诚实多数并升级至恶意安全。
Sofía Celi, Brave Research and University of Bristol; Rafael del Pino and Thomas Espitau, PQShield; Guilhem Niot, PQShield and Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA; Thomas Prest, PQShield
Carsten Baum and Marvin Beckmann, Denmark Technical University; Ward Beullens, IBM, Zürich; Shibam Mukherjee, Graz University of Technology and Know Center; Christian Rechberger, Graz University of Technology and TACEO
Rui Gao and Huaqun Wang, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, The State Key Laboratory of Tibetan Intelligence; Zhiguo Wan, Hangzhou Normal University; Yuncong Hu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Alexander Bienstock, Leo de Castro, Daniel Escudero, Antigoni Polychroniadou, and Akira Takahashi, J.P. Morgan AlgoCRYPT CoE and J.P. Morgan AI Research
Xiangfu Song, Nanyang Technological University; Jianli Bai, Singapore Management University; Ye Dong, National University of Singapore; Yijian Liu, Yu Zhang, and Xianhui Lu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Tianwei Zhang, Nanyang Technological University
Gabriel K. Gegenhuber, Interdisciplinary Transformation University (IT:U); Moritz Grefner, University of Vienna; Maximilian Günther, SBA Research; Matthäus Wininger, University of Vienna; David Schmidt, University of Vienna, UniVie Doctoral School Computer Science, and CDL AsTra; Aljosha Judmayer, University of Vienna
Taehyun Noh, University of Texas at Austin; Yingchen Wang, University of California Berkeley; Tal Garfinkel, Google; Mahesh Madhav, Ampere Computing; Daniel Moghimi, Google; Mattan Erez and Shravan Narayan, University of Texas at Austin
Stephan Dübler and Jana Hofmann, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP); Boris Köpf and Stavros Volos, Azure Research, Microsoft Distinguished Artifact Award Winner
Sanskar Amgain, University of Tennessee, Knoxville; Daniel Lobo, Atri Chatterjee, and Swarup Bhunia, University of Florida; Fnu Suya, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Zibo Gao, Jie Wang, Qihang Zhou, Lixiao Shan, Junjie Hu, Xiaoqi Jia, and Zhiqiang Lv, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Haoran Yan, Ziyu Shao, and Shuhao Zhang, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou); Qinhong Jiang, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Yan Long, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
核心总结
传统上电磁侧信道泄漏和电磁注入被视为分别威胁机密性和完整性的独立现象,本文研究如何利用电磁注入放大原本不可行的侧信道泄漏。作者提出Injection-Induced EM Side Channels框架,通过理论建模和实验测量揭示放大器、ADC、电源转换器等非线性硬件可将秘密电信号调制到注入载波上,从而把低频秘密升频为可测电磁发射。基于此设计InjectEave攻击,可通过可获取的RF设备在30米外、穿墙场景下窃听有线/无线耳机音频,并分析智能家居功耗、模拟传感器等低频秘密泄漏。案例研究还展示对固定电话通话的闭环窃听与操控,并讨论缓解措施。
Guoming Zhang, Shandong University and Quan Cheng Laboratory; Huiting Zhang, Zhenwei Lu, Heqiang Fu, Xin Gao, Riccardo Spolaor, and Yetong Cao, Shandong University; Yanni Yang and Pengfei Hu, Shandong University and Quan Cheng Laboratory
Merve Gülmez, Ericsson Security Research; Ruben Sturm, DistriNet, KU Leuven; Hossam ElAtali, University of Waterloo; Håkan Englund, Ericsson Security Research; Jonathan Woodruff, University of Cambridge; N. Asokan, University of Waterloo and KTH Royal Institute of Technology; Thomas Nyman, Ericsson Product Security
Sengim Karayalcin, Leiden University; Marina Krček, Radboud University; Stjepan Picek, University of Zagreb Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing & Radboud University
Hodong Kim and Gyeongsup Lim, Korea University; Seunghee Shin, State University of New York at Binghamton; Youngjoo Shin and Junbeom Hur, Korea University
Lukas Gerlach, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Marton Bognar, DistriNet, KU Leuven; Daniel Weber and Michael Schwarz, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Jo Van Bulck, DistriNet, KU Leuven
Cheng Gu, University of Rochester; Reese Levine, UC Santa Cruz; Zhenkai Zhang, Clemson University; Tyler Sorensen, Microsoft and UC Santa Cruz; Yanan Guo, University of Rochester
Xiaoyu Cheng, Southeast University; Fei Tong, Southeast University; Purple Mountain Laboratories; Jiangsu Province Engineering Research Center of Security for Ubiquitous Network; Zhenyu Lei, Fang Jiang, Zhe Zhou, and Guang Cheng, Southeast University; Trevor E. Carlson, National University of Singapore (NUS)
Simon Klix, Felix Hahn, Maik Ender, Nils Albartus, and Christof Paar, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP); Russell Tessier, University of Massachusetts
Ruiyi Zhang, Tristan Hornetz, Daniel Weber, Fabian Thomas, and Michael Schwarz, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
核心总结
本文提出了StackWarp,一种利用AMD Zen CPU上栈引擎的软件架构攻击,可以在SEV-SNP机密虚拟机内修改栈指针,从而完全破坏其完整性。该攻击依赖于一个未记录的MSR位,该位在逻辑核心之间状态未正确同步,使攻击者能跨逻辑核心确定性地调整栈指针,在包括最新Zen 5在内的多代CPU上均有效。研究展示了四种端到端攻击,包括RSA私钥恢复、OpenSSH密码认证绕过和权限提升,结论指出启用SMT破坏了SEV-SNP的完整性保证。
Amit Choudhari, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Fabian van Rissenbeck, Technische Universität Dortmund; Christian Rossow, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
该报告关注Secure by Design实践中开发者安全行为差异的问题,主张仅靠合规要求不足以推动安全开发,需要理解开发者行为并建立行为化操作手册。讲者结合在金融科技公司设计大规模安全赋能项目的经验,提出将行为科学融入安全软件开发,帮助组织从合规驱动转向可持续的安全文化。报告还介绍OWASP安全文化项目,强调以人为中心的安全、开发者行为和安全文化转型,目标是让安全开发成为开发者自然且最容易的选择。
Gilad Gressel and Rahul Pankajakshan, Center for Cybersecurity Systems & Networks, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Amritapuri; Shir Rozenfeld, Ben Gurion University of the Negev; Ling Li, Ca' Foscari University of Venice; Ivan Franceschini, University of Melbourne; Krishnashree Achuthan, Center for Cybersecurity Systems & Networks, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Amritapuri; Yisroel Mirsky, Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Vijay Prakash, New York University; Majed Almansoori, University of Wisconsin–Madison; Donghan Hu, New York University; Rahul Chatterjee, University of Wisconsin–Madison; Danny Yuxing Huang, New York University
Oluwole A. Adewusi, Assane Gueye, Wallace S. Msagusa, Jema David Ndibwile, David Nkundineza, Okemawo Obadofin, and Wilson Rutaremara, Carnegie Mellon University Africa; Blase Ur, University of Chicago Distinguished Paper Award Winner
Nazanin Sabri, University of California San Diego; Arkaprabha Bhattacharya and Sterling Williams-Ceci, Cornell University; Daniel V. Bailey, Independent Researcher; Rosanna Bellini, New York University
该报告标题强调安全工具本身不会检测攻击,最终是人在检测攻击,安全运营应重视人类分析员的核心判断作用。讲者 Krupa Brahmkstri 是 Visa 高级数据科学经理,领导开发 AI 驱动的网络安全解决方案,聚焦身份风险建模、内部威胁检测和安全运营自动化。其工作构建生产级机器学习系统,分析大量企业安全遥测以检测异常行为,并关注身份中心防御策略和可解释 AI 在安全运营中的应用。报告从工业实践角度说明如何用 AI 辅助人类分析员,而非替代人类,从而提升安全运营检测与响应效果。
Alaa Daffalla, Cornell University; Grace Myers, Cornell Tech; Rosanna Bellini, New York University; Thomas Ristenpart, University of Toronto; Nicola Dell, Cornell Tech
Kelechi G. Kalu, Sofia Okorafor, and Tanmay Singla, Purdue University; Sophie Chen, Carnegie Mellon University; Santiago Torres-Arias and James C. Davis, Purdue University
Ronald E. Thompson III and Hamza Khalid, Tufts University; Hilary Fisher, Brigham and Women's Hospital; Rhea Votipka, Beth Israel Lahey Health; Daniel Votipka, Tufts University
Arkaprabha Bhattacharya and Alaa Daffalla, Cornell University; Kevin Lee, Independent Researcher; Rosanna Bellini, New York University; Nicola Dell, Cornell Tech; Thomas Ristenpart, University of Toronto & Cornell Tech
Yanzi Lin and Cheng Zhang, Carnegie Mellon University; Madelyne Xiao, Princeton University; Lorrie Faith Cranor and Sarah Scheffler, Carnegie Mellon University
Tingxuan Tang, Nicolas Janis, and Kalyn Asher Montague, William & Mary; Kevin Eykholt, Dhilung Kirat, Youngja Park, and Jiyong Jang, IBM Research; Adwait Nadkarni and Yue Xiao, William & Mary
核心总结
该论文研究在真实 CTF 竞赛中人类选手如何使用 AI 助手,以及这种人机协作与全自主 AI 智能体的效果对比。作者开展了首次现场 CTF 中 AI 辅助的实证研究,对 95 名参赛者中的 41 人进行定性分析,考察其使用 AI 前后在认知、信任和期望上的变化,以及如何与插桩 AI 助手协作;同时在相同新挑战上基准测试四个自主 CTF 智能体并分析其轨迹。研究发现,AI 素养与领域知识是互补且不可替代的能力,熟练使用 AI 能放大专业技能;尽管先进自主智能体表现突出,但人机回环才是获胜范式,即 AI 加速探索而人类提供针对性指导与验证。最后作者讨论了 CTF 竞赛设计和构建有效人机回环安全 AI 系统的启示。
Tong Liu and Guozhu Meng, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Peng Zhou, Shanghai University; Zizhuang Deng, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University; State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Shandong University; Shuaiyin Yao and Kai Chen, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Anjun Gao, University of Louisville; Yueyang Quan, University of North Texas; Yufei Xia, University of Louisville; Zhuqing Liu, University of North Texas; Minghong Fang, University of Louisville
Chenqing Zhu, Southeast University; Yanbo Dai, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Yulong Tian, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics; Qingming Li, Zhejiang University; Songze Li, Southeast University and Engineering Research Center of Blockchain Application, Supervision and Management (Southeast University), Ministry of Education
Quan Zhao, Linkang Du, Yuntao Wang, and Zhou Su, Xi'an Jiaotong University; Zheng Li, Shandong University; Xiangshan Gao, Zhejiang University; Yang Zhang, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Jinyuan Liu, Tsinghua University; Tianshuo Cong, Shandong Key Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence Security, Shandong University; Pei Li, Shandong University; Tianrui Wang, Tsinghua University; Xinlei He, Wuhan University; Anyu Wang, State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Tsinghua University; Zhongguancun Laboratory; Xiaoyun Wang, State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Tsinghua University; Zhongguancun Laboratory; Shandong Institute of Blockchain; National Financial Cryptography Research Center
Haoyang Hu and Zhejun Jiang, The University of Hong Kong; Yueming Lyu, Nanjing University; Junyuan Zhang, The University of Hong Kong; Yi Liu, City University of Hong Kong; Ka-Ho Chow, The University of Hong Kong
Zijian Ling, Huazhong University of Science and Technology and Tsinghua University; Pingyi Hu, Xiuyong Gao, and Xiaojing Ma, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Man Zhou, Huazhong University of Science and Technology and Tsinghua University; Jun Feng and Songfeng Lu, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Dongmei Zhang and Bin Benjamin Zhu, Microsoft Corporation
Nguyen Linh Bao Nguyen, Wanlun Ma, and Viet Vo, Swinburne University of Technology, Australia; Alsharif Abuadbba, CSIRO, Australia; Minghong Fang, University of Louisville, USA; Jun Zhang and Yang Xiang, Swinburne University of Technology, Australia
Yuetian Chen, Yuntao Du, and Kaiyuan Zhang, Purdue University; Ashish Kundu, Cisco Research; Charles Fleming, Cisco Systems; Bruno Ribeiro and Ninghui Li, Purdue University
Meng Tong, University of Science and Technology of China; Yuntao Du, Purdue University; Kejiang Chen and Weiming Zhang, University of Science and Technology of China; Ninghui Li, Purdue University
该报告聚焦 AI 从“回答”转向“行动”的 agentic 时代所带来的新型安全风险,并分享对前沿模型和智能体进行红队的现场经验。作者所在 AIM Intelligence 同时开展自动化红队与生产环境实时护栏,以发现和控制 AI 系统漏洞。团队与 OpenAI 合作护栏,并联合运行韩国国家级 AI 红队项目,覆盖金融、制造、电信和公共部门等 15+ 企业与 7+ 政府机构。内容属于实践经验总结,强调对行动式 AI 进行持续攻击面评估和防御的必要性。
Mohan Zhang, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Yuqi Jia, Duke University; Zhen Tan, Arizona State University; Steven Jiang, hireEZ; Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Duke University; Tianlong Chen, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Dawn Song, UC Berkeley
Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini, Anthropic; Chawin Sitawarin, Google DeepMind; Sander V. Schulhoff, HackAPrompt, MATS; Jamie Hayes, Google DeepMind; Michael Ilie, HackAPrompt; Juliette Pluto and Shuang Song, Google DeepMind; Harsh Chaudhari, Northeastern University; Ilia Shumailov, AI Sequrity Company; Abhradeep Guha Thakurta, Google DeepMind; Kai Yuanqing Xiao, OpenAI; Andreas Terzis, Anthropic; Florian Tramèr, ETH Zurich
Xiaoyi Pang, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Xuanyi Hao, The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University; Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security; Pengyu Liu, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Qi Luo, Shandong University; Song Guo, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Zhibo Wang, The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University; Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security
Rabimba Karanjai, PayPal / University of Houston; Yang Lu, University of Houston; Hemanth Hegadehalli Madhavarao, PayPal; Lei Xu, Kent State University; Weidong Shi, University of Houston
Georgios Syros and Evan Rose, Northeastern University; Brian Grinstead and Christoph Kerschbaumer, Mozilla Corporation; William Robertson, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Alina Oprea, Northeastern University
核心总结
该论文针对 LLM Web agent 面临的间接提示注入攻击,指出现有评估依赖固定攻击模板、手工注入面或狭窄场景,难以反映真实自适应攻击。作者提出 MUZZLE 自动化 agentic 红队框架,利用 agent 轨迹自动识别高显著注入面,并自适应生成针对机密性、完整性和可用性违规的上下文恶意指令,还能根据失败执行反馈迭代优化。作者在多种 Web 应用、用户任务和 agent 配置上评估,发现 44 个新攻击,覆盖 4 个 Web 应用、10 个对抗目标,包括 3 个跨应用提示注入和针对 agent 定制的网络钓鱼场景。结果表明 MUZZLE 可在极少人工干预下自动、自适应地评估 Web agent 安全性。
Yu He and Haozhe Zhu, Zhejiang University; Yiming Li, Nanyang Technological University; Shuo Shao, Zhejiang University; Hongwei Yao, City University of Hong Kong; Zhihao Liu and Zhan Qin, Zhejiang University
Stefan Czybik, BIFOLD & TU Berlin; Anne Josiane Kouam, Inria & TU Berlin; Peter Heubl and Jan Magnus Nold, Ruhr-University Bochum; Konrad Rieck, BIFOLD & TU Berlin
Yi Liu, Zhihao Chen, and Yanjun Zhang, Griffith University; Gelei Deng, Nanyang Technological University; Yuekang Li, University of New South Wales; Jianting Ning, Zhejiang Key Laboratory of Digital Fashion and Data Governance, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University; Leo Yu Zhang, Griffith University
Haohua Duan, East China University of Science and Technology and Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Liyao Xiang, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Shanghai Innovation Institute; Xin Zhang, Ant Group; Baochun Li, University of Toronto; Bo Li, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Jaiden Fairoze, University of California, Berkeley; Sanjam Garg, University of California, Berkeley, and zkBricks Inc.; Keewoo Lee, Ethereum Foundation; Mingyuan Wang, New York University Shanghai
核心总结
Ball等人此前证明,在标准密码学假设下,运行速度显著快于被保护模型的提示过滤器无法通用地区分对抗性与良性提示,本文考察该不可能性结果是否会转化为已部署LLM系统中的真实漏洞。作者提出“受控释放提示”(controlled-release prompting),这是该理论框架的实用化实现,利用轻量输入过滤器与主模型之间的资源不对称性发起攻击;与理论构造不同,该攻击无需修改模型,可生成任何有界过滤器都无法解析、而目标LLM仍可处理的恶意提示。实验表明该攻击在Google Gemini、DeepSeek Chat、xAI Grok和Mistral Le Chat四个主流聊天平台上均成功,而基线方法均失败;作者还利用该攻击从Gemini中提取受版权保护的数据。最后,对14个开源提示护栏模型进行系统评估,发现即便是具备推理能力的过滤器也无法可靠检测该攻击,除非付出过高的资源开销。
Qin Yang, University of Connecticut; Lu Malloy, University of Tennessee; Joshua Lee, University of California, Santa Barbara; Xiaohan Chang, University of Connecticut; Meisam Mohammady, Iowa State University; Doowon Kim, University of Tennessee; Yuan Hong, University of Connecticut
Kunsheng Tang and Peigui Qi, University of Science and Technology of China; Yide Song, University of Washington; Wenbo Zhou, University of Science and Technology of China; Zhicong Huang, Ant Group; Qing Guo, Nankai University; Tianwei Zhang, Nanyang Technological University; Weiming Zhang and Nenghai Yu, University of Science and Technology of China; Jie Zhang, CFAR, A*STAR, Singapore
Hangtao Zhang and Yucheng Zhao, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Sishun Liu, Changsha University of Science and Technology; Ziqi Zhou, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Zeyu Ye, Xiangtan University; Wei Wan, City University of Macau; Minghui Li and Shengshan Hu, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Yanjun Zhang, Yi Liu, and Leo Yu Zhang, Griffith University
Lichao Wu, Sasha Behrouzi, and Mohamadreza Rostami, Technical University of Darmstadt; Stjepan Picek, University of Zagreb and Radboud University; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Technical University of Darmstadt
Shiqian Zhao, Nanyang Technological University; Jiayang Liu, Nanyang Technological University; and Institute of Science Tokyo, Japan; Yiming Li, Runyi Hu, and Xiaojun Jia, Nanyang Technological University; Wenshu Fan, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Xiaobao Wu and Xinfeng Li, Nanyang Technological University; Jie Zhang, CFAR and IHPC, Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore; Wei Dong and Tianwei Zhang, Nanyang Technological University; Luu Anh Tuan, Nanyang Technological University and VinUniversity
Shae McFadden, King's College London, The Alan Turing Institute, and University College London; Myles Foley, The Alan Turing Institute and Devotion AI Labs; Elizabeth Bates, The Alan Turing Institute; Ilias Tsingenopoulos, KU Leuven; Sanyam Vyas, Cardiff University and The Alan Turing Institute; Vasilios Mavroudis, King's College London; Chris Hicks, The Alan Turing Institute; Fabio Pierazzi, University College London
Yongxin Cai, Guangzhou University; Jing Qiu, Guangzhou University and Pengcheng Laboratory; Qingming Li, Zhejiang University; Du Cheng, Tsinghua University; Lei Chen, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
Cen Zhang, Georgia Institute of Technology and Microsoft; Younggi Park, Independent Researcher; Fabian Fleischer, Yu-Fu Fu, and Jiho Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology; Dongkwan Kim, Microsoft; Youngjoon Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology; Qingxiao Xu, Texas A&M University; Andrew Chin, Georgia Institute of Technology; Ze Sheng, Texas A&M University; Hanqing Zhao, Georgia Institute of Technology; Michael Pelican and David J. Musliner, Smart Information Flow Technologies (SIFT); Jeff Huang, Texas A&M University; Jon Silliman, Mikel Mcdaniel, Jefferson Casavant, Isaac Goldthwaite, Nicholas Vidovich, and Matthew Lehman, Kudu Dynamics; Taesoo Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology and Microsoft
Addison Crump, Sahil Sihag, Florian Bauckholt, and Keno Hassler, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Thorsten Holz, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
Yiling He, University College London; Junchi Lei, Hongyu She, and Shuo Shao, Zhejiang University; Xinran Zheng, University College London; Yiping Liu, Alibaba Group; Zhan Qin, Zhejiang University; Lorenzo Cavallaro, University College London
该工作讨论大语言模型(LLM)评估在真实安全与决策支持场景中失效的问题,其核心动机是许多应用缺乏明确、可形式化的“真值”,传统基准评估难以反映部署效果。作者结合在微软大规模 AI 安全系统、威胁检测和告警关联中的经验,强调人类在环评估、纵向质量测量以及真实操作环境下的模型行为分析。主要贡献是指出静态评估与生产运行需求之间的鸿沟,并倡导采用更贴近实际安全运营的评估框架。由于提供材料未给出具体实验数据,本文以经验性观察与评估方法论讨论为主。
Jaehong Kim, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) and Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP); Hyeonseung Kim, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST); Jiseon Kim, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) and Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP); Alice Oh, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST); Thorsten Holz, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP); Wonjae Lee, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST); Meeyoung Cha, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP) and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
Zhaolin Wei, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University; Dengpan Ye, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, and Cyberspace Institute of Advanced Technology, Guangzhou University; Yanjiao Chen, College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University; Jiacheng Deng, Ziyi Liu, Yuhan Lin, and Yunna Lv, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University; Yueyun Shang, School of Mathematics and Information Science, Guangzhou University; Zhihong Tian, Cyberspace Institute of Advanced Technology, Guangzhou University
Xinxin Fan, State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Wenxiong Chen, Dalian University of Technology; and State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Quanliang Jing, State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Chi Lin, Dalian University of Technology; Shaoye Luo, State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Wenbo Song, Dalian University of Technology; and State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Yunfeng Lu, Beihang University
Maximilian Thang, Technical University of Darmstadt; Lichao Wu, University of Bristol; Sasha Behrouzi and Mohamadreza Rostami, Technical University of Darmstadt; Jona te Lintelo, Radboud University; Stjepan Picek, University of Zagreb and Radboud University; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Technical University of Darmstadt
Jiayimei Wang, City University of Hong Kong; Tao Ni, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology; Guowen Xu, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Qingchuan Zhao and Cong Wang, City University of Hong Kong
Zhuoyi Shang, Jiasen Li, and Pengzhen Chen, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; and State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense; Yanwei Liu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense; Xiaoyan Gu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; and State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense; Weiping Wang, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Yichi Zhang and Zhiqi Wang, The Pennsylvania State University; Huan Zhang, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Yuchen Yang, The Pennsylvania State University
Jie Cao, Qi Li, Zelin Zhang, and Xiaodong Wu, Queen's University; Lingshuang Liu, University of Waterloo; Xiangman Li and Jianbing Ni, Queen's University
核心总结
该论文研究 AI 生成图像水印对模型无关移除攻击的鲁棒性。现有攻击要么只针对特定生成模型,要么在移除水印时造成严重视觉退化。作者提出 MarkNull,一种基于流形潜在操纵的模型无关水印移除攻击;其关键观察是带水印图像的生成潜在表示与嵌入的初始噪声之间存在强统计依赖。为此引入噪声-潜在对齐分数(NLAS),并构造优化目标,在保持语义保真度的同时选择性地解除潜在表示与水印的相关性。实验覆盖后处理式、微调式和初始噪声式水印方案,MarkNull 将平均比特准确率降至 53.14%(接近随机猜测 50%),且无可感知图像退化;MarkNull-A 将攻击蒸馏为单次前向,达到 0.50 秒/图,并成功攻击 Google SynthID-Image,还可迁移到视频水印。论文最后提出攻击检测机制,强调需要设计能抵抗模型无关潜在空间攻击的水印。
Leiming Yan, Xinlong Xu, and Ziqiang Li, Engineering Research Center of Digital Forensics, Ministry of Education, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology
Zixin Rao, Wentian Zhu, and Chan Aristella Lu, University of Georgia; Zhaorun Chen, University of Chicago; Wei Niu and Le Guan, University of Georgia; Bo Li, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Zhen Xiang, University of Georgia
Mengyu Yao, MOEKey Lab of HCST (PKU), School of Computer Science, Peking University; Ant Group; Ziqi Zhang, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Yifeng Cai and Junlin Liu, MOEKey Lab of HCST (PKU), School of Computer Science, Peking University; Xinyi Fu and Weiqiang Wang, Ant Group; Xiangqun Chen, Yao Guo, and Ding Li, MOEKey Lab of HCST (PKU), School of Computer Science, Peking University
Zhichao Li, Hongshan Yang, Zhibo Wang, Huiyu Xu, and Junhong Lai, Zhejiang University; Yaopeng Wang, Southeastern University and Zhejiang University; Kui Ren and Chun Chen, Zhejiang University
Dario Pasquini, RSAC Labs; Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos and Giuseppe Ateniese, George Mason University; Omer Akgul, Athanasios Theocharis, and Petros Efstathopoulos, RSAC Labs
Jun Liu, University of Macau; National Institute of Informatics; Leo Yu Zhang, Griffith University; Fengpeng Li, University of Macau; Isao Echizen, University of Tokyo; National Institute of Informatics; Jiantao Zhou, University of Macau
核心总结
该论文研究仅依赖 top-1 预测的硬标签黑盒对抗攻击。现有方法存在两个关键局限:忽视初始化的重要作用,且依赖经验启发式而缺乏理论保证。作者建立统一理论框架,表明现有符号翻转硬标签攻击可理解为对真实梯度符号的近似;在此指导下提出新攻击框架,包含零查询初始化策略和模式驱动优化(PDO)算法。理论分析保证其初始化相比随机基线具有更高余弦相似度,且 PDO 的查询复杂度显著低于基线搜索方法。在 CIFAR-10、ImageNet、ObjectNet 以及标准与对抗训练模型、商业 API 和 CLIP 模型上的实验表明,该方法在成功率和效率上持续优于 SOTA 硬标签攻击,尤其在低查询预算下;还能泛化到损坏数据(ImageNet-C)、生物医学图像(PathMNIST)和分割等密集预测任务,并绕过有状态防御 Blacklight,检测率为 0%。
Zehang Deng, Swinburne University of Technology and CSIRO's Data61; Haoyang Li, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Wanlun Ma, Swinburne University of Technology; Ruoxi Sun and Derui Wang, CSIRO's Data61; Minhui Xue, CSIRO's Data61 and Responsible AI Research (RAIR) Centre, Adelaide University; Haibo Hu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Sheng Wen and Yang Xiang, Swinburne University of Technology
Carter Luck, University of Massachusetts Amherst; Olive Franzese-McLaughlin, Vector Institute and University of Toronto; Elisaweta Masserova, Carnegie Mellon University; Akira Takahashi and Antigoni Polychroniadou, J.P. Morgan AI Research and AlgoCRYPT CoE; Nicolas Papernot, Vector Institute and University of Toronto
Changyue Jiang, Fudan University and Shanghai Innovation Institute; Jiayi Wang, Xin Wen, Jiarun Dai, and Geng Hong, Fudan University; Xudong Pan, Fudan University and Shanghai Innovation Institute
Heng Jin, Chaoyu Zhang, and Hexuan Yu, Virginia Tech; Shanghao Shi and Ning Zhang, Washington University in St. Louis; Y. Thomas Hou and Wenjing Lou, Virginia Tech
核心总结
云基础设施已成为部署大模型(尤其是 LLM)的主流平台,微调与推理日益被委托给云服务商,但这造成了根本性的信任缺口:尽管已有密码学与 TEE 验证方案,但高昂的证明成本和有限的 TEE 内存使其难以扩展到现代 LLM,客户端实际上无法审计这些过程,从而带来静默破坏服务完整性的安全隐患。本文提出 AFTUNE,一个可审计、可验证的框架,用于保证云端微调与推理的计算完整性。AFTUNE 引入轻量的记录与抽查机制,生成可验证的执行轨迹,使客户端日后能够通过在 TEE 内验证被抽样的执行块(每块仅覆盖模型与执行轨迹的一小部分)来审计微调与推理是否遵循了约定配置。评估表明 AFTUNE 仅带来适度开销,使客户端审计在实践中变得可行。
Mengyu Yao, MOEKey Lab of HCST (PKU), School of Computer Science, Peking University; Ziqi Zhang and Ning Luo, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Shaofei Li, Yifeng Cai, Xiangqun Chen, Yao Guo, and Ding Li, MOEKey Lab of HCST (PKU), School of Computer Science, Peking University
Chunlin Qiu, Ang Li, Tianxiao Huang, Ruilin Gan, Yunjie Ge, and Shenyi Zhang, Wuhan University; Huayi Duan, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou); Lingchen Zhao, Wuhan University; Chao Shen, Xi'an Jiaotong University; Qian Wang, Wuhan University
Liwen Wang, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Wenxuan Wang, Renmin University of China; Shuai Wang, Zongjie Li, Zhenlan Ji, and Zongyi Lyu, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Daoyuan Wu, Lingnan University; Shing-Chi Cheung, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Alex Kantchelian, Google; Casper Neo, Palace Cybersecurity; Ryan Stevens, Hyungwon Kim, Zhaohao Fu, Sadegh Momeni, Birkett Huber, Cem Topcuoglu, Senaka Buthpitiya, Elie Bursztein, Yanis Pavlidis, Martin Cochran, and Massimiliano Poletto, Google
Yuyang Zhang, Xudong Jiang, Yuxuan Song, and Yuxiang Sun, Wuhan University; Yihao Huang, National University of Singapore; Run Wang, Shundi Xiao, and Lina Wang, Wuhan University
Pengxiang Ma and Ningyu He, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Zhongchun Cao, ChainFlag; Zihao Li, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Xiapu Luo, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Nora Sinong Lu and Chon Kit Lao, University of Macau; Yunlong Mao, Nanjing University; Xiaobo Zhou, University of Macau; Ruizhe Jia, Stanford University; Kanye Ye Wang, University of Macau
Pulkit Garg, Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur; Robin Verma, Marshall University; Somitra Sanadhya, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur; Gaurav Gupta, MeitY, Government of India
Daan Vansteenhuyse, Arthur Bols, and Lieven Desmet, DistriNet, KU Leuven; Victor Le Pochat, Independent; Jo Van Bulck and Marton Bognar, DistriNet, KU Leuven
核心总结
该论文关注安全会议论文配套工件(代码和数据)的共享实践与会议政策影响。作者开发了自动化工具 ArtiFinder,用于准确识别论文 PDF 中的工件链接,并据此对 2000 年以来四大安全会议近 9000 篇论文进行了迄今最大规模的定量分析。纵向分析显示工件共享持续增长,但不同子领域差异显著;近期政策变化并不总伴随共享率上升,却与转向稳定托管服务明显相关。作者还复现了此前关于引用数和仓库流行度的分析。该研究揭示了工件共享趋势和会议组织者的引导作用,并开源工具与数据集以支持未来大规模研究。
Philip Klostermeyer, Jan-Ulrich Holtgrave, Jacques Suray, Anne Vonderheide, Nicolas Lodzig, Niklas Busch, Alexander Krause, Jan H. Klemmer, Marten Oltrogge, and Sascha Fahl, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Martin Bach, Technology Innovation Institute; Vukašin Karadžić, TU Darmstadt; Lukas Knittel, Ruhr-University Bochum; Robert Merget and Jean Paul Degabriele, Technology Innovation Institute
Robert Merget, Technology Innovation Institute; Nurullah Erinola and Marcel Maehren, Ruhr University Bochum; Lukas Knittel, Ruhr University Bochum; Sven Hebrok, Paderborn University; Marcus Brinkmann, Ruhr University Bochum; Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University; Jörg Schwenk, Ruhr University Bochum
Tianchang Yang, Ali Ranjbar, Gang Tan, and Syed Rafiul Hussain, The Pennsylvania State University
核心总结
Open RAN(O-RAN)通过开放接口和软件化组件增强了移动网络的灵活性,但也引入了逻辑正确性验证的挑战。本文提出InvaRAN测试框架,利用动态推断的程序不变量作为预期行为的代理来检测O-RAN实现中的逻辑缺陷。该框架将不变量分为关键和非关键类别,并能捕获执行跟踪中的跨变量相关性。在生产级O-RAN控制器上的评估发现了九个未知问题,包括逻辑和内存漏洞。
Ruixuan Li, Tsinghua University; Xingyu Zhao, Zhejiang Gongshang University; Yunyi Zhang and Baojun Liu, Tsinghua University; Jun Shao, Zhejiang Gongshang University and Zhejiang Key Laboratory of Big Data and Future E-Commerce Technology
核心总结
论文发现流行域名托管服务商在域名所有权验证中错误理解CNAME语义:即使别名域未配置任何验证令牌,服务商仍接受CNAME重定向后的DNS记录作为有效挑战令牌。基于该缺陷,作者提出ALIASLEAP攻击,可劫持CNAME链中别名域的托管服务,导致大规模、隐蔽的域名接管。实测发现4个邮件和7个Web托管服务商受影响,波及超200万个域名,其中20万个位于Tranco Top 1M;且脆弱CNAME链通常合法且长期存在,约一半持续超过12个月,最多19,819个域名暴露超过10年。作者提出缓解策略并负责任披露给11家服务商,8家确认,呼吁社区重新审视CNAME记录的使用惯例与能力边界。
Zhaozhou Tang, Georgia Institute of Technology; Khaled Serag, Qatar Computing Research Institute; Z. Berkay Celik, Purdue University; Vijay Ganesh, Saman Zonouz, and Raheem Beyah, Georgia Institute of Technology
Yangyang Liu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Zhengjie Du, Geely Automobile Research Institute; Xiaofang Wang, Geely University of China; Yang Yin, Geely Automobile Research Institute; Xiapu Luo, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Anna Ablove, University of Michigan; Johnnie Walker, GFW Report; Ben Wolin, University of Michigan; Niklas Niere and Felix Lange, Paderborn University; Aaron Ortwein, Armin Huremagic, and Richa Priyanka, University of Michigan; Ali Zohaib and Jade Sheffey, University of Massachusetts Amherst; Nico Heitmann, Paderborn University; J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan; Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University; Amir Houmansadr, University of Massachusetts Amherst; Roya Ensafi, University of Michigan; Mingshi Wu, GFW Report; Eric Wustrow, University of Colorado Boulder
Qiguang Zhang, Junzhou Luo, and Zhen Ling, Southeast University; Yue Zhang, Shandong University and Quancheng Laboratory; Kaizheng Liu and Chongqing Lei, Southeast University; Matthew Harper and Xinwen Fu, University of Massachusetts Lowell
Jerry Yu, Yibo Wei, Sumanth Rao, Mohak Vaswani, and Jefferson Chien, UC San Diego; Christian Dameff, UC San Diego Health; Nishant Bhaskar and Aaron Schulman, UC San Diego
核心总结
车辆越来越可通过手机 App 使用 BLE 进行离线远程控制,但许多后装 BLE 遥控系统未采用 BLE 内置安全,而是使用私有应用层协议,形成新的攻击面且缺乏研究。论文发现并分析六种在用的后装 BLE 遥控系统,重点研究其应用层 BLE 安全。在三种系统中发现严重漏洞,估计约 140 万套后装 BLE 控制系统暴露于攻击风险。研究表明定向 BLE 远程攻击可行:攻击者可利用众包蓝牙扫描数据库定位装有脆弱系统的特定车辆。披露后所有厂商均修补系统并改进应用层 BLE 安全,影响许多原本不知道车辆装有 BLE 遥控系统的车主。
Paul Flammarion, Stanford University; George Hosono, Georgia Institute of Technology; Wilson Nguyen, Laura Bauman, Daniel Rebelsky, and Gerry Wan, Stanford University; David Adrian, Independent; Zakir Durumeric, Stanford University
Maarten Weyns, Dario Ferrero, and Stefan Op de Beek, Delft University of Technology (TU Delft); Daniel Wagner, Max Planck Institute for Informatics / DE-CIX; Georgios Smaragdakis and Harm Griffioen, Delft University of Technology (TU Delft)
Yepeng Pan and Christian Rossow, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
核心总结
UDP 是 DNS、视频会议等流行服务的重要传输协议,但其对 IP 分片的依赖会带来安全与可靠性问题,现有 Linux IP 分片重组算法依赖每网络命名空间缓冲区大小限制,可能被资源耗尽型 DoS 攻击利用。本文系统评估了针对真实 UDP 服务(VPN、视频会议、RADIUS)的 IP 分片 DoS 攻击可行性,并从客户端和服务端两个视角分析。服务端方面,伪造 ICMP Fragmentation Needed 消息可诱使许多服务商按人为小路径 MTU 分片服务器到客户端流量;客户端方面,向 Linux NAT 网关发送虚假分片可导致合法服务器到客户端分片被丢弃。模拟攻击证明该攻击对 Zoom、ExpressVPN 等真实服务商有效,作者已向受影响方全面披露并提出缓解建议。
Qihang Peng and Siyuan Tian, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, BNRist, Tsinghua University; Yongxin Qiu, Beihang University; Jinyang Huang, Central South University; Yaru Yang, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, BNRist, Tsinghua University; Xiang Li, Nankai University; Zhongguancun Laboratory; Jia Zhang, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, BNRist, Tsinghua University; Zhongguancun Laboratory; Yiming Zhang, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, BNRist, Tsinghua University; Haixin Duan, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, BNRist, Tsinghua University; Quancheng Laboratory; Yunsenxiao Lin and Shugen Chen, Tencent Technology Co., Ltd.; Liqun Yang, Beihang University
Dezhang Kong, Zhejiang University; Yilun Zhang, Purdue University; Zekun Xie, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications; Ningpeng Zheng, Yancheng Institute of Technology; Shi Lin, Zhejiang Gongshang University; Zhenhua Xu, Zhejiang University; Minghao Li, Chongqing University; Zhebo Wang, Xiang Chen, and Changting Lin, Zhejiang University; Dong Zhang, Fuzhou University; Xuan Liu, Yangzhou University; Chunming Wu and Meng Han, Zhejiang University
核心总结
地址学习是 SDN 的基础服务,维护主机地址到交换机端口的动态映射并支撑众多关键网络应用,但其核心地位也使其成为有吸引力的攻击目标;由于缺乏全局视角下的安全保护,单个看似正常的事件可以累积造成严重破坏。本文提出 LoopGen,一种针对地址学习机制的新型攻击:被攻陷的主机只需按特定顺序发送精心构造的数据包,即可诱使控制器在数据平面创建转发环路。该环路使 LoopGen 成为高性价比的 DoS 放大器,可与其他 DoS 攻击组合使用。作者在多种真实拓扑、不同开源控制器和异构交换机上进行了广泛实验,结果表明 LoopGen 具有不容忽视的可行性、显著的放大效果、低攻击成本,并且在现有防御下具备高隐蔽性;论文最后提出了两种缓解该攻击的对策。
Mehdi Ziazi, ETH Zurich; Khalid Aleem, Independent; Harshad Sathaye, ETH Zurich; Martin Strohmeier, Cyber-Defence Campus, armasuisse Science + Technology
Yuntian Chen, Northwest University; Xi'an Key Laboratory of Advanced Computing and Software Security; Shaanxi International Joint Research Center for the Battery-Free Internet of Things; Tianpei Lu, The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University; Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security; Zhanyong Tang, Northwest University; Xi'an Key Laboratory of Advanced Computing and Software Security; Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Passive Internet of Things and Neural Computing; Bingsheng Zhang, The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University; Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security; Zhiying Shi, Northwest University; Xi'an Key Laboratory of Advanced Computing and Software Security; Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Passive Internet of Things and Neural Computing; Yuxiang Luan, Northwest University; Xi'an Key Laboratory of Advanced Computing and Software Security; Zhuzhu Wang, Northwest University; Xi'an Key Laboratory of Advanced Computing and Software Security; Shaanxi International Joint Research Center for the Battery-Free Internet of Things
Àlex Miranda-Pascual, Kalrsruhe Institute of Technology and Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya; Javier Parra-Arnau, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya; Thorsten Strufe, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Li Bai, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Junxu Liu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and PolyU Research Centre for Privacy and Security Technologies in Future Smart Systems; Sen Zhang, Xinwei Zhang, and Qingqing Ye, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Haibo Hu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and PolyU Research Centre for Privacy and Security Technologies in Future Smart Systems
Khoa Nguyen, Khiem Ton, and NhatHai Phan, New Jersey Institute of Technology; Issa Khalil, Hamad Bin Khalifa University; Khang Tran and Cristian Borcea, New Jersey Institute of Technology; Ruoming Jin, Kent State University; Abdallah Khreishah, New Jersey Institute of Technology; My T. Thai, University of Florida
Tim Vlummens, COSIC, KU Leuven; Aniketh Girish and Nipuna Weerasekara, IMDEA Networks Institute; Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius and Gunes Acar, Radboud University; Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, IMDEA Networks Institute
Konstantinos Spyridakis, Ioannis Arkalakis, Michalis Diamantaris, and Sotiris Ioannidis, Technical University of Crete; Jason Polakis, University of Illinois Chicago; Panagiotis Ilia, Cyprus University of Technology
核心总结
Android Health Connect旨在统一健康与健身数据管理,承诺本地存储、细粒度权限和透明控制,但其实际隐私风险尚不清楚。本文首次实证研究Health Connect,发现其设计存在固有缺陷,可形成隐蔽通信通道并绕过访问控制。通过动态分析,作者发现60.9%应用不符合UI数据透明指南,25.6%不报告健康记录收集或共享,19.6%将Health Connect数据(含其他应用生成记录)外传,并与姓名、邮箱、广告ID、电话等PII结合。研究违反Google政策并削弱用户控制预期,已披露给Health Connect团队并推动政策执行。
Quan Shi, National University of Singapore; Liying Wang, Peking University; Prosanta Gope, University of Sheffield; Qi Liang and Haowen Wang, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications; Qirui Liu, Peking University; Chenren Xu, Peking University and Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies, Ministry of Education (PKU); Shangguang Wang and Qing Li, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications; Biplab Sikdar, National University of Singapore
Lin Liu and Ziling Wei, National University of Defense Technology; Zhuotao Liu and Xinhao Deng, Tsinghua University; Zixuan Dong and Shuhui Chen, National University of Defense Technology
Kasra EdalatNejad, Sebastian Faust, Jonas Hofmann, Philipp-Florens Lehwalder, and Thomas Schneider, Technical University of Darmstadt Distinguished Artifact Award Winner
Samuel Breckenridge, Dani Vilardell, and Andrés Fábrega, Cornell Tech, IC3; Amy Zhao, Ava Labs, IC3; Patrick McCorry, Arbitrum Foundation; Ari Juels, Cornell Tech, IC3
Zixin Wang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Sunyup Park, University of Maryland, College Park; Haojian Jin, University of California, San Diego; Yaxing Yao, Johns Hopkins University
核心总结
该论文关注智能环境中多用户间的隐私冲突,以Airbnb中配备摄像头的智能设备为例,探索隐私协商策略以支持未来设计。研究开发了24个故事板,变化设备类型、协商发起者、策略(物理调整 vs 金钱补偿)和结果(接受 vs 拒绝)四个因素,并进行了N=400的小故事调查研究。研究发现设备类型和策略显著影响评估:物理调整始终比金钱补偿更受偏好,且车道摄像头协商比室内设备(如电视视频会议设备、智能显示设备)获得更积极的评价。研究总结了支持隐私协商的设计启示。
Mashiyat Mahjabin Eshita, BRAC University; Ishmam Bin Rofi, Rochester Institute of Technology; Md. Sabbir Ahmed, BRAC University; Dipto Das, University of Toronto; Md. Golam Rabiul Alam, BRAC University; Jannatun Noor, C2SG Research Group, United International University; Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, University of Toronto; S M Taiabul Haque, BRAC University
Mirza Kamrul Bashar Shuhan, George Mason University; Foteini Baldimtsi, George Mason University & Mysten Labs; Giuseppe Ateniese, George Mason University
Na Li, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China; Yansong Gao, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University, China; Hongsheng Hu, School of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China; Boyu Kuang, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China; Anmin Fu, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China; and School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China
Siping Shi, The University of Hong Kong; Rui Lu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Dan Wang, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Bihai Zhang, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Zheng Zhang, Qi Ling, and Kian Kasad, Purdue University; Brendan Ryan Sweeney, UT Austin; Deepak Gupta, Meta Platforms Inc.; Tal Garfinkel, Google; Kazem Taram, Purdue University Distinguished Paper Award Winner
Renpeng Zhang, Beihang University and Zhongguancun Lab; Kai Shen, Beihang University; Peng Jiang, Southeast University; Ding Li, Peking University and Zhongguancun Lab; Shujiang Wu, Beihang University; Lei Wang, Beihang University and Zhongguancun Lab
Zhipeng Jia and Xiaokang Yin, Information Engineering University; Shuitao Gan, Laboratory for Advanced Computing and Intelligence Engineering; Chao Zhang, Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University; JCSS, Tsinghua University (INSC) - Science City (Guangzhou) Digital Technology Group Co., Ltd.; Hangtian Liu, State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing; Jiangan Ji, Enzhou Song, and Ruijie Cai, Information Engineering University; Jinglei Tan, State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing; Shengli Liu, Information Engineering University
Jakob Koschel, Andrea Mambretti, Alessandro Sorniotti, Pietro Moretto, and Claudio Migliorelli, IBM Research Europe; Andrea Di Dio and Cristiano Giuffrida, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Anil Kurmus, IBM Research Europe
Yichen Liu, Stony Brook University; Berk Çakar, Purdue University; Aman Agrawal and Minseok Seo, Stony Brook University; James C. Davis, Purdue University; Dongyoon Lee, Stony Brook University
Weiheng Wu, School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University; Wei Qiao, School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University; State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks (ISN); Teng Li, School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University; State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks (ISN); Songshan Laboratory; Yebo Feng, Nanyang Technological University; Zhuo Ma and Jianfeng Ma, School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University; Yang Liu, Nanyang Technological University
Yilin Li, Shandong University; Jianliang Wu, Simon Fraser University; Chaoshun Zuo, Independent Researcher; Qingchuan Zhao, City University of Hong Kong; Xiaofeng Liu, Xiangpu Song, Chengyu Hu, and Shanqing Guo, Shandong University
核心总结
安卓上的Tap-to-X(如tap-to-pay)把NFC标签触碰视为用户在场和意图的证明,但系统在标签发现后的分发过程安全性研究不足。本文分析Android的post-tap标签分发,发现两个OS级设计弱点造成语义来源缺口,使本地恶意应用无需任何NFC交互即可伪造物理触碰。作者实现标签分发伪造攻击TDFA,并在Alipay、Huawei AI Life、Samsung Galaxy Wearable等真实应用中验证。对76,333个Google Play应用进行大规模分析,识别601个可能受影响应用,并在498个可测试应用中成功伪造投递;作者提出OS级修复建议,获Google等多个CVE与致谢。
Hongkai Chen, Arizona State University; Yuqing Yang, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Chao Wang, The Ohio State University; Arpit Nandi, Arizona State University; Moritz Schloegel, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang, and Adam Doupé, Arizona State University; Zhiqiang Lin, The Ohio State University; Yan Shoshitaishvili, Arizona State University
Hongyi Lu, Southern University of Science and Technology and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Fengwei Zhang, Southern University of Science and Technology; Zhenkai Zhang, Clemson University; Shuai Wang, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Yanan Guo, University of Rochester
Oliver Braunsdorf and Tim Lange, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Konrad Hohentanner and Julian Horsch, Fraunhofer AISEC; Johannes Kinder, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Luis Burbano, University of California, Santa Cruz; Hampei Sasahara, The University of Tokyo; Ruoyu Song and Z. Berkay Celik, Purdue University; Alvaro A. Cardenas, University of California, Santa Cruz
Ruizhe Zhao, Cong Sun, and Zongzhen Li, State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University; Tiantian Wang, Northeastern University; Yunbo Wang, State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University
核心总结
实时嵌入式系统广泛用于无人机和自动驾驶等信息物理系统,易受控制流劫持与数据攻击,但传统 CFI/DFI 开销过大,而控制流认证(CFA)检测延迟难满足实时约束。论文提出 ARTO,首个将控制流认证与数据流保护结合的执行完整性证明方案,力求在实时限制内提供强安全。ARTO 通过证明者侧路径分段和基于哈希的验证结果缓存,以极低运行时成本提供部分上下文敏感保护,并把完整上下文敏感检测外包给远端验证者。它还实现基于等价类的数据流保护,将内存读的地址目标检查与关键变量值检查结合,强于现有操作完整性执行。在机器人车辆自动驾驶上的评估表明,ARTO 能缓解控制流和数据攻击且运行时开销满足实时限制,并优于现有 CFA 和操作完整性执行方法。
Qinhong Jiang, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Yan Long, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou); Youqian Zhang, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Chen Yan and Xiaoyu Ji, Zhejiang University; Xiapu Luo, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Kevin Fu, Northeastern University; Jiannong Cao, The Hong Kong Polytechnical University; Wenyuan Xu, Zhejiang University
Qiyang Song, Qihang Zhou, Xiaoqi Jia, and Zhenyu Song, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Wenbo Jiang, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Heqing Huang, Independent Researcher; Yong Liu, Qi An Xin Technology Group Inc.; Dan Meng, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Sam Collins, Tom Chothia, William Burgess, and Marius Muench, The University of Birmingham; David Oswald, Durham University Distinguished Paper Award Winner
核心总结
虚拟化安全 VBS 是现代 Windows 桌面防御的基石,其虚拟化安全内核可对特权攻击者提供强安全保证,但本文提出一种仅依赖软件的“Download More RAM”内存别名攻击,无需物理接触即可破坏这些保证。在运行常见消费级 DIMM 的系统上,该攻击可实现任意内存读写,使特权用户攻破操作系统各级,包括安全内核、HVCI 及其提供的所有防御。作者进一步针对 VBS 保护进程、Windows Defender、杀毒与 EDR 软件以及游戏反作弊开展案例攻击。微软已为该发现分配 CVE-2026-23670 并发布部分缓解补丁,该工作质疑了此类系统的关键信任假设。
Ruben Sturm and Anton Schelfhout, DistriNet, KU Leuven; Merve Gülmez, Ericsson Security Research; Adriaan Jacobs and Stijn Volckaert, DistriNet, KU Leuven
Shiwen Wang, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Wu Luo, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS; Kaicheng Liu and Zheyuan Xu, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Yaowen Zheng, Wenhao Wang, Shijun Zhao, Peinan Li, and Rui Hou, State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS
Miaoqian Lin, The University of Hong Kong; Kai Chen, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Hao Chen, The University of Hong Kong
Ruiqi Dong, Swinburne University of Technology; Yiyi Wang, Tsinghua University and Zhongguancun Laboratory; Kunpeng Zhang, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Dongsong Yu, Zhongguancun Laboratory; Xiaogang Zhu, Adelaide University; Shaohua Wang, Central University of Finance and Economics; Shuai Wang, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Chao Zhang, Tsinghua University and Zhongguancun Laboratory; Sheng Wen and Yang Xiang, Swinburne University of Technology
Feng Dong and Jianting Gao, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Yunpeng Tian, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Weifeng Yuan, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Mu Zhang, University of Utah; Zesen Ye and Jietao Yang, Beijing CyberKunlun Technology Co., Ltd; Zhiniang Peng, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
核心总结
该论文关注Windows远程服务作为关键攻击面,在共享服务主机模型(svchost.exe)下,单个资源耗尽漏洞可引发同驻服务的命运共享故障。然而大多数漏洞发现仍以崩溃为中心,对不会立即引发异常的静默、长时程资源泄漏(如内存/句柄耗尽)视而不见,且闭源Windows生态系统限制了源码级消毒器的适用性。作者提出REDOSPECTOR,一个用于在 opaque Windows二进制中发现面向资源的拒绝服务(DoS)漏洞的模糊测试框架。REDOSPECTOR结合了(1)通过拦截原生ntdll堆例程的轻量级进程内钩子遥测,(2)基于放大的预言,通过重复执行和增长趋势分析识别持久泄漏,以及(3)混合种子生成管道,利用静态二进制分析和LLM到达深层协议状态。在Windows 11(24H2)和Windows Server Preview的最新版本上评估,REDOSPECTOR在核心服务(包括MSMQ、远程桌面网关和CDP)中发现了19个漏洞,导致12个分配的CVE。微软确认了CDP中的七个预认证DoS问题并进行了架构调整,表明REDOSPECTOR能暴露逃避常规模糊测试的资源管理缺陷。
Zhiao Wei, University of Waterloo; Chao Wang, The Ohio State University; Haseeb-Ur-Rehman Faheem, University of Waterloo; Luyi Xing, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Yousra Aafer, University of Waterloo; Zhiqiang Lin, The Ohio State University
核心总结
微信等超级应用内嵌的小程序因灵活便捷而迅速流行,并通过底层 API 提供丰富功能,但这种紧密集成带来严重安全风险:小程序常继承宿主超级应用从移动操作系统获得的权限,可能绕过关键安全检查,因此亟需针对小程序的更细粒度访问控制。本文提出 PERMSCOPE,一个系统化框架,用于检测和分析小程序 API 中缺失的作用域检查,揭示 Android 权限被隐式继承并在小程序 API 中被行使(即缺少“请求并检查”原语)的情形。作者对四款主流超级应用的实证分析发现,有 183 个(8.85%)API 未在小程序 API 层得到恰当保护。文章讨论了该问题背后的挑战,并呼吁超级应用开发者在小程序 API 边界实施细粒度访问控制,以增强移动超级应用生态的可信度。
Bing Qi, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Yi Yang and Xiangkun Jia, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Key Laboratory of System Software (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Zhengpin Qian and Huafeng Huang, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Purui Su, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Key Laboratory of System Software (Chinese Academy of Sciences)
Arash Daneshmand, University of British Columbia Okanagan and Concordia University; Hugo Kermabon-Bobinnec, Concordia University; Lingyu Wang, University of British Columbia Okanagan and Concordia University; Makan Pourzandi, Ericsson Security Research, Ericsson Canada; Suryadipta Majumdar, Concordia University; Yosr Jarraya, Ericsson Security Research, Ericsson Canada
Decheng Chen, South China University of Technology; Zhi Zhang, The University of Western Australia; Zhenkai Zhang, Clemson University; Xin Zhang, Shandong University; Yansong Gao, Southeast University; Yi Zou, South China University of Technology
Yunju Gu, Jaeyeol Park, and Donghyun Kwon, Pusan National University
核心总结
Arm TrustZone-M(TZ-M)通过将执行划分为安全和非安全状态为小型嵌入式系统提供硬件隔离,但任一状态中的内存漏洞仍可被利用进行控制流劫持。现有嵌入式CFI研究存在局限:许多忽略安全状态、未能保护TZ-M状态转换期间的控制流事件,或带来过高性能开销。本文提出XCFI,一种面向TZ-M的全面CFI机制,采用32位控制流标识符(CID)在安全和非安全状态统一实施细粒度CFI,覆盖间接分支、返回、异常等所有控制流事件,并首次将CFI执行扩展到TZ-M跨状态控制流事件。XCFI为所有TZ-M执行上下文提供全面控制流保护,仅带来适度运行时开销。
Jiaqian Peng, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Puzhuo Liu, Ant Group; Tsinghua University; Kai Cheng, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Zhaoteng Yan, School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Jie Liu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Chengnian Sun, University of Waterloo; Hongsong Zhu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Zhenzhe Shao, Sun Yat-sen University and Zhejiang University; Jiashuo Zhang, Peking University; Zihao Li, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China and The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Daoyuan Wu, Lingnan University; Chong Chen and Yiming Shen, Sun Yat-sen University; Lingfeng Bao, Zhejiang University and Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security; Yanlin Wang, Sun Yat-sen University; Jiachi Chen, Zhejiang University and Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security
Mingyuan Huang, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Han Liu, College of Cryptology and Cyber Science, Nankai University; Shuo Yang, Sun Yat-sen University; Daoyuan Wu, Lingnan University; Shuai Wang, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Junyu Wang, Missouri University of Science and Technology; Changjia Zhu, University of South Florida; Yuanbo Zhou, Missouri University of Science and Technology; Lingyao Li, University of South Florida; Xu He, Visa Inc.; Mingkui Wei, George Mason University; Junjie Xiong, Missouri University of Science and Technology
Daud Ahmed, IMDEA Software Institute and Universidad Politécnica de Madrid; Srdjan Matic, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Platon Kotzias and Emiliano Carlesi, BforeAI; Juan Caballero, IMDEA Software Institute
Pei Chen, Geng Hong, Yicheng Qin, Huazhe Wang, Mengying Wu, and Min Yang, Fudan University; Ziru Zhao, Yuanpeng Zhu, and Tao Su, vivo Mobile Communication Co., Ltd
Mahbub Alam, Texas A&M University; Muhammad Lutfor Rahman, California State University San Marcos; Sonjoy Kumar Paul, Amy W. Hays, Aftab Hussain, Md Imanul Huq, and Nitesh Saxena, Texas A&M University
Louis Jannett, Ruhr University Bochum; Andreas Mayer and Maximilian Westers, Heilbronn University of Applied Sciences; Vladislav Mladenov, Ruhr University Bochum; Christian Mainka, University of Wuppertal; Jörg Schwenk, Ruhr University Bochum
Tina Marjanov, University of Cambridge; Taro Tsuchiya, Carnegie Mellon University; Konstantinos Ioannidis and Jack Hughes, University of Cambridge; Nicolas Christin, Carnegie Mellon University; Alice Hutchings, University of Cambridge